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Abstract
J. Beck has shown that if two players alternately select previously
unchosen points from the plane, Player 1 can always build a congruent
copy of any given finite goal set G, in spite of Player 2’s efforts to stop
him [B]. We give a finite goal set G (it has 5 points) which Player 1 cannot
construct before Player 2 in this achievement game played in the plane.
1 Introduction
In the G-achievement game played in the plane, two players take turns choosing
single points from the plane which have not already been chosen. A player
achieves a weak win if he constructs a set congruent to the goal set G ⊂ R2
made up entirely of his own points, and achieves a strong win if he constructs
such a set before the other player does so. (So a ‘win’ in usual terms, e.g.,
in Tic-Tac-Toe, corresponds to a strong win in our terminology.) This is a
special case of a positional hypergraph game, where players take turns choosing
unchosen points (vertices of the hypergraph) in the hopes of occupying a whole
edge of the hypergraph with just their own points. [B,B96] contain results and
background in this more general area.
The type of game we are considering here is the game-theoretic cousin of
Euclidean Ramsey Theory (see [G] for a survey). Fixing some r ∈ N and some
finite point set G ⊂ R2, the most basic type of question in Euclidean Ramsey
Theory is to determine whether it is true that in every r-coloring of the plane,
there is some monochromatic congruent copy of G.
Restricting ourselves to 2 colors, the game-theoretic analog asks when Player
1 has a ‘win’ in the achievement game with G as a goal set. Though one can
allow transfinite move numbers indexed by ordinals (see Question 4 in Section
3), it is natural to restrict our attention to games of length ω, in which moves
are indexed by the natural numbers. In this case, a weak or strong winning
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Figure 1: The goal set G. Player 2 can force a draw when the goal is this set,
where θ is any irrational multiple of π less than pi
9
.
strategy for a player is always a finite strategy (i.e., must always result in weak
or strong win, respectively, in a finite, though possibly unbounded, number
of moves) so long as the goal set G is finite. J. Beck has shown [B] that both
players have strategies which guarantee them a weak win in finitely many moves
for any finite goal set—the proof is a potential function argument related to the
classical Erdo˝s-Selfridge theorem [ES]. The question of when the first player
has a strong win—that is, whether he can construct a copy of G first—seems
in general to be a much harder problem. (A strategy stealing argument shows
that the second player cannot have a strategy which ensures him a strong win:
see Lemma 3.5.)
For some simple goal sets, it is easy to give a finite strong winning strategy
for Player 1. This is the case for any goal set with at most 3 points, for example,
or for the 4-point vertex-set of any parallelogram. We give a set G of 5 points
for which we prove that the first player cannot have a finite strong win in the
G-achievement game (proving, for example, that such finite goal sets do in fact
exist). This answers a question of Beck (oral communication).
Fix θ = tπ, where t is irrational and t < 1
9
. Our set G is a set of 5 points
gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, all lying on a unit circle C with center c ∈ R
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, the
angle from gi to gi+1 is θ. The point g5 (the ‘middle point’) is the point on C
lying on the bisector of the angle ∠g2cg3. (See Figure 1.) We call this set the
irrational pentagon.
Theorem 1.1. There is no finite strong winning strategy for Player 1 in the
G-achievement game when G is the irrational pentagon.
Idea: Let θnc (x) denote the image of x ∈ R
2 under the rotation nθ about the
point c. An important property of the irrational pentagon is that once a player
has threatened to build a copy of it by selecting all the points g1, g2, g3, g4, he can
give a new threat by choosing the point θc(g4) or θ
−1
c (g1). Furthermore, since θ
is an irrational multiple of π, the player can continue to do this indefinitely, tying
up his opponent (who must continuously block the new threats by selecting the
corresponding middle points) while failing himself to construct a copy of G. If
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Figure 2: Proving Lemma 2.1
Player 1 is playing for a finite strong win, he cannot let Player 2 indefinitely
force in this manner. However, to deny Player 2 that possibility, we will see
that Player 1’s only option is the same indefinite forcing, which leaves him no
better. The rest of the rigorous proof is a case study.
2 The Proof
For the proof of Theorem 1.1, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. There are no three unit circles C1, C2, C3 so that the pairs Ci,Cj
each intersect at 2 distinct points xij and yij, so that the angles ∠xijciyik are
less than pi
3
for all j 6= i 6= k.
Proof. Let Bi denote the unit ball whose boundary is Ci for each i, and choose
Ci and Cj from {C1, C2, C3} so that the area A(Bi ∩Bj) is maximal. In Figure
2, for any Ck intersecting the circle Cj at points xjk, yjk lying on Cj between r1
and r2, we would have A(Bi∩Bk) > A(Bi∩Bj), a contradiction. The maximum
angle between the points r1 and r2 on Cj is
2pi
3
.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.1. Let G now denote the irrational
pentagon.
It is clear that Player 2 can either play indefinitely or reach a point where
it is his move, he has a point h1 at least 10 units away from any of Player 1’s
points, and Player 1 has no more than 2 points in any given (closed) ball of
radius 10. (For example: on each turn until he has reached this point, Player 2
moves at least 30 units away from all of Player 1’s points.) Reaching this point,
Player 2 begins to build a copy of G; that is, he arbitrarily designates some
‘center point’ c at unit distance from the point h1, and chooses as his move a
point h2 which is an angle θ away from h1 on the unit circle C centered at c. In
fact, h1 and h2 lie on two unit circles which are disjoint except at h1, h2, and
so Player 1’s response can lie on only one of them; thus we assume without loss
of generality that his response does not lie on the circle C.
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Following Player 1’s response, Player 2 will continue constructing his threat
by choosing the point h3 which lies on the circle C and is separated from the
points h1, h2 by angles 2θ, θ, respectively. Thus regardless of Player 1’s choice
of response, we see that Player 2 can reach the following situation:
It is Player 1’s turn, Player 2 has points h1, h2,h3 separated consecutively(⋆)
by angles θ on a unit circle C centered at c, and Player 1 has at most 3 points
in any unblocked copy of G. Finally, Player 1 does not control 4 points of any
unblocked copy of G, and controls at most one point within 8 units of c.
Moreover, there is in fact at most one unblocked copy of G on which Player(⋆⋆)
1 has 3 points, and, if it exists, Player 1 controls no other points within (say) 5
units of those 3 points.
We classify the rest of the proof into Cases 1,2,3 based on Player 1’s move.
The analysis in Cases 1 and 3 depend just on the conditions in paragraph (⋆),
while Case 2 depends on the conditions in both paragraphs (⋆) and (⋆⋆).
Case 1: A natural response for Player 1 might be to play on the circle C,
thus attempting to prevent Player 2 from building a significant threat. Since
no point is a rotation of h1 about the point c by both positive and negative
integer multiples of θ
2
, we may assume WLOG that Player 1 does not choose
any rotations of h1 about c by positive integer multiples of
θ
2
. Thus Player 2
responds by choosing the point h4 on C which is at an angle θ, 2θ, 3θ from the
points h3, h2, h1, respectively. Since Player 2 is now threatening to build a copy
of G on his next move and Player 1 is not (he has ≤ 3 points on any unblocked
copy of G), Player 1 must take the point on C which together with h1, h2, h3, h4
complete a copy of G. Player 2’s response is naturally to choose the point h5 on
C at angle θ, 2θ, 3θ from h4, h3, h2, and we are in essentially the same situation:
Player 1 has always at most 3 points in any unblocked congruent copy of G
(since he has only one point ‘near’ C which is not on C, and any set congruent
to G and not on C intersects C in at most 2 points), and Player 2 can force
indefinitely.
Case 2: Another response for Player 1 which may be possible is to play
within the vicinity of his previously chosen points such that he controls 4 points
of an unblocked copy of G. By (⋆⋆) Player 1 has only one 4-point threat, and so
Player 2 can choose the corresponding fifth point to avoid losing. Now, Player
1 may be able to continue to make threats on his subsequent moves, but it is
easy to check using the conditions of (⋆⋆) that his moves will have to stay on a
single unit circle C1 to do so, and that he will never be able to generate more
than one threat, and thus never be able end his indefinite forcing with a win.
On the other hand, each time it is Player 1’s move, the conditions in paragraph
(⋆) are still satisfied, and so any move other than a continuation of the forcing
will allow the analysis from Cases 1 and 3 to apply.
Case 3: Finally, we consider the case where Player 1 does ‘none of the
above’; that is, he chooses a point not on the circle C, but which nevertheless
does not increase to 4 the number of points he controls in some congruent copy
of G. This is the case where we make use of Lemma 2.1.
Player 1 now has as many as two points within 8 units distance of the
4
point h1. By choosing successively points h4, h5, h6, etc., as in Case 1, Player
2 hopes to successively force Player 1 to take the corresponding fifth point of
each congruent copy of G that Player 2 threatens to build at each step. The
only snag is this: it is conceivable that Player 1, in taking these corresponding
‘fifth’ points, builds his own threat. He already has two points in the vicinity,
and it is possible that they lie on a congruent copy of G which intersects the
circle C in two points which Player 1 will eventually be forced to take by Player
2’s moves. In this case, Player 2 would have to respond and could conceivably
end up losing the game if Player 1 is able to break is forcing sequence.
Of course, this is only truly a problem if Player 1 is threatening this in ‘both
directions’—that is, regardless of whether h4 is at angles θ, 2θ, 3θ to the points
h3, h2, h1, respectively, or to the points h1, h2, h3, respectively. However, such a
double threat is immediately ruled out by Lemma 2.1, since this would require
two sets S1, S2 ∼= G (each a subset of a 3θ-arc of a unit circle) intersecting
each other in two points (previously chosen by Player 1) and each also each
intersecting C in two places. This completes the proof.
3 Further Questions
1. Our (rather crude) methods do not appear suited to much larger goal sets.
So we ask: are there arbitrarily large goal sets G for which Player 1 cannot force
a finite strong win in the G-achievement game played in R2?
2. We have examples of 4-point sets for which Player 1 has strong winning
strategies, and we have given here a 5-point example where Player 2 has a
drawing strategy. Are there 4-point sets where Player 2 has a drawing strategy?
3. Player 1 can easily be shown to have strong winning strategies for any goal
set of size at most 3, and any 4-point goal set which consists of the vertices of
a parallelogram. It is not difficult to give a 5 point goal set for which Player
1 can be shown to have a strong winning strategy. Are there arbitrarily large
goal sets G for which Player 1 has a strong winning strategy?
4. We restricted our attention here to the first ω moves, and indeed, our proof
does not show that Player 1 can’t force a strong win if transfinite move numbers
are allowed. So we ask: are there finite sets G for which Player 1 cannot force
a strong win, when the players make a move for each successor ordinal?
5. In the general achievement game played on a hypergraph (in which the two
players select vertices, and the goal sets are the edges) we define some stronger
win types for Player 1:
Definition 3.1. In the achievement game played on a hypergraph H, Player 1
has a fair win if he builds some e ∈ E(H) on a turn which comes before any
turn on which Player 2 builds some f ∈ E(H).
Each ‘turn’ of the game consists of a move by Player 1 followed by a move
by Player 2. Definition 3.1 requires simply that Player 1 builds a goal set in
fewer turns than it takes Player 2 to do the same (if Player 2 can at all).
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Figure 3: The hypergraph HT , in the case where T is the balanced binary
directed tree of depth 2.
Definition 3.2. In the achievement game played on a hypergraph H, Player 1
has an early win if he builds some e ∈ E(H), say in n moves, such that there is
no m ≤ n for which Player 2 had |e| − 1 points of a set e ∈ E(H) on his mth
turn, and on which Player 1 had no point on his mth turn.
So every early win is a fair win, and every fair win is a strong win. In
general, none of the win types we have defined are the same, and they all occur
for Player 1 for some hypergraph: Already for K4, Player 1 has a strong win
but not a fair win. On the hypergraph HT , whose vertices are the vertices of
some balanced binary directed tree T , and whose edges are the vertex-sets of
longest directed paths in T (Figure 3), Player 1 has a fair win and an early win.
Finally, let the hypergraph Fn have vertex set [n] × {0, 1}. Edges are of two
types: Type 1 edges are the n-subsets S ⊂ [n]×{0, 1} for which the π1(S) = [n]
and (1, 0) ∈ S, and Type 2 edges are all the pairs {(m, 0), (m, 1)} where m ∈ [n]
(see Figure 4). Player 1 has a fair win in Fn for n ≥ 2, but not an early win.
Probably, however, the situation is not so rich in the plane:
Conjecture 3.3. There is no finite point set G ⊂ R2 for which Player 1 has
a strategy which ensures a fair win in the G-achievement game played in the
plane.
The conjecture may seem painfully obvious. If we play the achievement game
in R \ {c} for any point c ∈ R2, for example, Player 2 can prevent a fair win by
always choosing the point which is the central reflection across c of Player 1’s
last move. Annoyingly, even proving that Player 1 cannot have an early win for
any G when playing in R2 may be very difficult.
For the sake of completeness, we note the situation on the hypergraph HT
is in some way the worst possible for Player 2. It is easy to see that although
Player 2 never occupies all but one vertex of an unblocked edge when playing
on HT , it is easy for him to occupy all but one vertex of some edge which may
be blocked. The natural strengthening of the ‘early win’ suggested here never
occurs for Player 1:
Definition 3.4. In the achievement game played on a hypergraph H, Player 1
has a humiliating win if he occupies some e ∈ E(H) before Player 2 occupies all
but one vertex of some edge f ∈ E(H).
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Figure 4: The hypergraph F3. There are four (in general 2
n−1) Type 1 edges,
and three (in general n) Type 2 edges. (The vertex (1, 0) is marked with ×.)
(So every humiliating win is an early win.) The fact that Player 1 never has a
humiliating win will follow from the strategy stealing argument; we include the
proof for completeness.
Lemma 3.5 (Strategy Stealing). On any hypergraph H, a second player cannot
have a strategy which ensures strong win in the achievement game.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 3.5 is the strategy stealing argument; we include
the proof for completeness. We argue by contradiction: if the second player has
a strong win strategy σ (a function from game positions to vertices), the first
player makes an arbitrary first move g (his ghost move). Now on each move,
the first player mimics the second player’s strategy by ignoring his ghost move:
formally, let Gn denote the game’s position on the nth move, and let Gn \ x
denote the game position modified so that the vertex x is unchosen. Then on
each turn, the first player chooses the point σ(Gn \ g) if it is not equal to g (and
thus must be unoccupied, since σ is a valid strategy), or, if σ(Gn \ g) = g, the
first player chooses an arbitrary point x ∈ V (H) and sets g := x. The fact that
σ was a ‘strong win’ strategy for the second player implies that the first player
will occupy all of an edge e ∈ E(H) (even requiring e 6∋ g) before the second
player occupies all some some edge f ∈ E(H). In particular, the first player has
a strong win, a contradiction.
Fact 3.6. On any hypergraph H, Player 2 can prevent Player 1 from achieving
a humiliating win.
Proof. Denote by x the vertex Player 1 chooses on his first move. The hyper-
graph H\x is the hypergraph with vertex-set V \ {x} and edges e\ {x} for each
e ∈ E(H). We see that Player 1 has a humiliating win on H only if he has a
strong win on H \ {x} as a second player, and we are done by Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 3.5 is deceptive in its simplicity. Of course we emphasize that the
strategy stealing argument shows only the existence of a strategy for a first
player to prevent a second player strong win. In general, we have no better way
to find such a strategy than the na´ıve ‘backwards labeling’ method, which runs
on the whole game tree. Thus, though Fact 3.6 tells us that Player 2 should
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never fall more than one behind Player 1 (in the sense of Definition 3.4), it is
quite possible for this to happen in actual play between good (yet imperfect)
players.
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